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Abstract 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the Internet has become a pressing problem. I11 this paper, we 
describe. analyze and evaluate route-based distributed packet filtering (DPF) .  a n o ~ e l  approach to  
distributed DoS (DDoS) attack prevention. \Ve show tha t  there is an  intimate relationsliip between 
the effectiveness of D P F  a t  mitigating DDoS attacks and power-law network tol~ology. We evaluate 
performance using Internet autonoinous system and artificially generated topologies. 
The  sa.lient features of this work are t~vo-fold. First. we show tha t  D P F  is able t o  proactively 
filter out  a significant fraction of spoofed pacltet flows and prevent attack packets froill reaching their 
targets in the first place. The  IP flo~vs that  cannot be proactively curtailed are extremely sparse 
such tha t  their origin ca.n be localized-i.e.. I P  tra.ceback-to a:it,l~in a small. constant number of 
candidate sites. \Ve show tha t  the two proactive and reactive performance effects can be achieved 
by implementing route-based filtering on less than 20% of lnt,ernet autonomous system (AS) sites. 
Second, we show tha t  the two complelnentary performance measures are dependent on the proper- 
ties of the underlying AS graph topology. In particular. we sho~v that  the power-law structure of 
Internet AS topology leads t o  connectivity properties which are crucial in facilitating the observed 
performance effects. 
-4s a DDoS prevention architecture. D P F  is able to emulate the I P  traceback pronjess of proba- 
bilistic packet marking, while a.lleviating the la.tt,er's three principal lveaknesses: (i) need to inscribe 
link information in the I P  pacltet header. (ii) rea~t~ireness-tracebaclt occurs after the impact of 
DoS attack has been felt-and (iii) scalability where t,he effort needed to  achieve I P  ti-aceback grows 
proportionally \vit,h the number of attack hosts engaged in a DDoS attack. 
- - - - - 
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'-4dditiorlallv supported by NSF grarlts .AM-9714707, XNI-9875789 (C.4REER): ESS-9SOGi4l. .4NI-0082SGl (ITR). 
arld grants frorrl t l ~ e  Purduc R.esearc11 Fourldatiorl, Sailta Fe Iilstitute. Sprirlt. and Xerox. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Denial of service (DoS) is a pressing problem on the Internet as evidenced by recent at,t,acks on coin- 
mercial servers and ISPs and their consequent disruptioil of services [8]. DoS attacks [4. 11. 1'7. 301 
consume resources associated with various network elements-e.g.. Web servers, routers. fircwalls. aiid 
end hosts-which impedes the efficient functioning and provisioning of services in accordance wit11 
their intended purpose. Their impact is more pronounced than network congestion due to the concen- 
trated and targeted nature of resource depletion and clogging, which not only iinpact,~ quality of service 
(QoS) but can affect the very availability of services. When the attack is distributed---e.g.. affected by 
multiple cornpromised hosts on the Internet-then its impact is proportionally severe. 
Susceptibility to DoS is an intrinsic problem of any service provisioning system where. at a niinimnin. 
t,he occurrence of a potentially valid event (e.g., service request,. TCP SYN packet,) must be processetl 
t,o ascertain its validity. Even though the resource expenditure associated with processing a single 
event may be negligible. when this is multiplied by the large factors enabled by the high bandwidth of 
modern broadband networks, its impact can be significant no matter how small the individual processing 
overhead. As with prank telephone calls or ringing of door bells in days gone by. an effective nleans 
of preventing DoS attacks from occurring in the first place-also the only fundamental solution give11 
the intrinsic susceptibility of service provisioning systems to DoS-lies in identification of' the attacker 
which admits assigning commensurate costs (e.g.. legal or economical) to the perpetrating entity. Even 
if the attack was instituted from compromised hosts intruded by an attacker, if the physical source of 
DoS traffic can be identified. then at the very least the invaded network element can be isolated or shut 
down, and in some instances, the attacker's identity can be further traced back by state information 
remnant on the compromised system. 
In this paper we address two complementary problems and goals: (1) source identification (i.e.. IP  
traceback) of' spoofed IP  flows, and (2) prevention of spoofed I P  packets fi-om reaching their destination. 
We describe a novel approach to proactive/reactive distributed DoS (DDoS) attack prevention called 
route-based distributed packet filtering and evaluate its efficacy in Internet autonomous system (AS) 
topologies. 
1.2 New Contributions 
Route-based distributed packet filtering (DPF) uses routing information to determine if a packet arriv- 
ing at a router-e.g., border router at an AS-is valid with respect to its inscribed source/destination 
addresses, given the reachability constraints imposed by routing and network topology. A single AS- 
there were 4572 autonomous systems on thc Intcrnct in 1999-can only exert a limited iinpact with 
respect to identifyiilg and discarding forged IP  flows. At the other extreme, if all aut,oilomous systeills 
and their routers implement router-based packet filtering, then no spoofed IP  flows can escape. but its 
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Route-based DPF's main strength lies in t,he fact that with partia.1 coverage or deployment,---about 
18% in Internet AS t,opologies-a synergistic filtering effect can be achieved that proa.ctively prevents 
spoofed IP  flows froin reaching other autonomous systems in the first place. Proactive protection, 
due to intrinsic c~nnectivit~y properties of Internet topology, cannot be perfect. It is. however, strong 
enough such that those IP  flows that cannot be prevented from penetrating are sufficiently sparse and, 
as a consequence, their origin can be localized to within 5 possible sites. Thus, as with probabilistic 
packet marking, effective IP  traceback can serve as a deterrent as well as facilitate responsive, albeit 
reactive recovery upon attack. Another important proactive advantage of route-based DPF over. PPM 
is its rob~st~ness wit,h respect to dis tr ibuted DoS. Unlike PPM whose attack site localization deteriorates 
almost2-proportionally with the number of attack hosts [20]---thus necessitating commensurate time and 
effort by the victim to recover-in route-based DPF the fract,ioil of AS from which spoofed IP  flows can 
reach other AS is a small subpopulation (less than 12%) ~v l~ ich  inakes harnessing attack sites (e.g., by 
intrusion) in a DDoS attack more difficult for the attacker. From an implementation perspective. DPF 
does not require expending IP  header fields to encode stamped link information as PPM does. I-Iowever, 
computing appropriate filtering tables alongside existing inter-domain routing protocols (e.g., BGP) is 
a nontrivial problem due to the destination-based structure of Internet routing protocols (inter-domain 
and intra-domain). 
We submit that few fundamental solutions exist fbr preventing distributed DoS attacks. and this 
paper's main contribut,ion lies in advancing a scalable architecture for DDoS attack prevention that 
is effective for Internet AS topology and is, in principle. implementable in IP internetworks if global 
routing information is made available at  border routers. We define relevant performance measures 
that capture pertinent filtering performance-both proact,ive and reactive-and show their intimate 
dependence on power-law structure of Internet AS topology. We demonstrate the efficacy of route-based 
DPF using comprehe~lsive benchmarking with both Iilter~let AS and artificially generated network 
topologies. Finding efficient implementations and evaluating t,he costs associated with deployment and 
router overhead vis-a-vis the demonstrated performance benefits is a major challenge in itself and a 
task for future work. 
The rest of t,he paper is organized as follo~vs. In the next section. we give a summary of related 
works. In Section 3. we define the key notions. measurement. and performance variables for route-based 
DPF. We also discuss the core issues surrounding performance evaluation. In Section 4. we present 
performance results based on benchmark experiments with both real and artificial network topologies. 
We conclude with a discussion of our results. 
2 Related Work 
Several types of DoS atstacks have been identified [S. 17. 301 with the most basic DoS attack demanding 
more resources thail trhe target system or network can supply. R.esources may be network bandwidth, 
file system space. processes, or network connectlions [17]. While host,-based DoS attacks are more easily 
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traced and managed. network-based DoS attacks which exploit weaknesses of the TCP/ IP  protocol 
suite [Is]. represent a inore subtle and challenging threat [17: 231. Network-based DoS att-acks. by 
default. employ spoofing to forge the source address of DoS packets, and thereby hide the identity of 
the pllysical source [4]. Previous works have focused oil detecting DoS attacks and mitigating their 
detriniental impact upon the victim [l: 13; 24, 271. This approach does not eliminate t,he problem, nor 
does it deter pot,eilt,ial attackers. 
A number of recent works have studied source identification-also called I P  traceback [23]-which 
span a range of t,echniques with their individual pros and cons. In link testing. the physical source of 
an attack is identified by tracing it back hop-by-hop through the network [29]. Traceback is typically 
performed manually and recursively repeated at the upstream router until the originating host is 
reached. The drawbacks of link testing include multiple branch points, slow traceback during an 
attack. cominunicat,ion overhead due to message exchange. and administrative const,raint,s between 
network operators [29]. The audit trail approach facilitates tracing via traffic logs a.t routers and 
gateways [22. 281. This method is conducive to off-line traceback of DoS attacks. A principal weakness, 
however. is the high storage and processing overhead incurred at  routers which call exert a significant 
burden. In behavioral monitoring [17], the likely behavior of an attacker during a DoS attack is 
monitored to identify the source. For example, an attacker may perform DNS requests to resolve the 
name of the target host which may not be resident in its local name server's cache. During a DoS 
attack, an attacker inay try to gauge the impact of the attack using various service request.s including 
Web and ICMP echo requests. Thus, logging of such events and activities can reveal inforination about 
the attacker's source. 
In packet-based traceback, packets are marked with the addresses of intermediat,e routers, in some 
sense, an inverse operation of source routing and similar to the I P  Record Route option [21]. The 
victim uses illformation inscribed in packets to trace the attack back to its source. A related method is 
generating information packets-separate from data packet-t,hat convey analogous path information 
as ICMP traceback inessages to the victim [2]. In both methods, overhead in the form of variable- 
length markiiig fields that depend on path length or traffic overhead due to extra messaging packets 
are incurred. Probabilistic packet marking [3, 231 has been proposed for achieving the best of both 
worlds-space efficiency in the form of constant marking field and processing efficiency in the form of 
minimal router support-at the expense of introducing uncertainty due to probabilistic sampling of 
a flow's path. The effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking was analyzed when considering the 
intrinsic vulnerability of marking field spoofing [20] and shown that the attacker's location can be 
localized to within 5 equally likely sites on the Internet under single-source attack. Improved marking 
schemes including for authentication were studied in [26]. I11 spite of its efficie~lcy pr~pert~ies,  PPM 
has several drawbacks: (i) spoofed packets are allowed to exert their debilitating influence on server 
resources before being reactively curtailed: (ii) bits in the I P  header must be expended to inscribe link 
information; and (iii) uncertainty of I P  traceback amplifies proportionally wit11 the nunlber of hosts 
partaking in the distributed DoS attack. We show that route-based distributed packet filtering, in 
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addition to matching the IP  traceback prowess of PPM. solves its three weaknesses. 
Packet filtering is a network security mechanism for controlling what data can flow to and from 
a net,work affected routers or firewalls [33]. Filtering decisions. t,ypically. are made based on packet 
content including source/destination addresses and port numbers. As a means of preventing network- 
based DoS attacks. ingress filtering in border gateways has been proposed for limiting I P  source address 
spoofiilg [5, 7. 25, 3 1 1 .  Ingress filtering requires a prolonged period to be broadly deployed on the 
Internet, and even then, it is subject to attacks from AS that are not compliant (see Section 4.5 for a 
discussion of its performance effects). 
3 Route-based Distributed Packet Filtering 
3.1 Route-based Detection of Spoofed IP Packets 
Consider the AS topology shown in Figure 3.1 which depicts the routes from node 2 to all other nodes 
(solid arrows). Assume a host belonging to AS 7 is attempting a DoS attack targeted at  a server 
residing in AS 4 by using a forged source I P  address belonging to AS 2. A border router belonging 
to AS 6 at  t,he peering point with AS 7-if cognizant of the route t,opology-would recognize that a 
packet originating from AS 2 destined t,o AS 4 would not enter through link (7.6) implying that its 
source address must be spoofed. Such packets could be discarded at AS 6 thus proactively protecting 
AS 4 from the DoS attack. Note that in this specific instance AS 6 only need inspect the source I P  
address to determine that no packet froin AS 2-irrespective of destination IP  address-can arrive on 
link (7.6). This example serves to illustrate the potential opportunities available by exploiting routing 
information to identify and filter spoofed packets at  forwarding points in t,he system. We remark that 
- Rouie, fiom  node 2 
. . . * Ar~ack flom node 7 w i ~ h  node 2 addles5 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of route-based packet filtering executed a t  node 6. Note 7 uses I P  address 
belonging to node 2 when attacking node 4. 
the above description--from an inter-domain I P  routing perspective -is imprecise. First, an edge in the 
AS graph between a pair of nodes is in general a set of peering point connections and all corresponding 
border routers must carry out the specified filtering tasks. Second, two or more IP  prefixes belonging 
to the same destination AS may lead to different, pat,hs on an AS topology. This is incorporated in our 
AS inodel by allowing multi-path routring. Third, we ignore potentially relevant classification of AS 
nodes into stub, multi-homed: and trailsit AS where only the latter may engage in routing proper (i.e., 
in the sense of packet forwarding). Wheii we speak of an AS node performing route-based filtering, 
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it must be understood that the finer resolution picture is more complex. although logical consistency 
between the two descriptions is achieved. 
Consider the case where the attack host residing in AS 7 uses an I P  address belonging to AS 8 
when attacking servers in AS 4. The gateway at  AS 6 cannot unambiguously decide that the I P  packet 
with source address in AS 8 is spoofed since it may indeed have come from AS 8 (and forwarded by 
AS 7). This demonstrates that performing route-based filtering at  a single site can achieve only so 
much. Route-based distributed packet filtering aims to achieve a synergistic, proactive filtering effect 
through the collective action of a small number of AS nodes. The key objectives of D P F  can be 
summarized as follows: (i) maximize proactive filtering of spoofed I P  packets: (ii) for bogus packets 
that do get through, miniinize the number of sites that could have sent the packets ( IP  traceback): 
achieve objectives (i) and (ii) while minimizing the number of sites at  which route-based filtering is 
carried out; (iv) in tandem with (iii). find the optimum sites where filtering is to be performed. 
3.2 Maximal and Semi-maximal Filters 
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph representing Internet AS t,opology. We remark that our 
framework and conclusions may be carried over to router topologies within an AS, however, presently 
little is known about the internal structure of large, commercial autonomous systems1, and testing 
needs to await further measurement studies. Let L(u, v) denote the set of all loop-free paths from u to 
v where u, v E V. A routing algorithm and its computed routes lead to a subset R(u ,  v) L(u ,  v). An 
I P  packet M ( s ,  t )  wit11 source I P  address s and destination I P  address t is routed through the net,work 
according to R(s;  t) .  If I R(s ,  t )  1 > 1. we assume a separate net,work mechanism resolves selection among 
multiple paths. Performance results for multi-path routing are discussed in Section 5.7. 
A filter Fe : v2 + (0.1) is a function defined for link e = (u. v) E E where this is interpreted 
to mean that a gateway router in v acting as a peering point inspects an IP  packet M ( s .  t )  arriving 
on e, then decides whether to forward the packet (I;k(s, t )  = 0), or filter-i.e., discard-the packet 
(Fe(s . t )  = 1). We call 17, a 1-ou.te-based packet filter with respect to R if 
C 0: if e E R(s.  t ) ;  Fe(s ,  t )  = 1,  otherwise. 
To avoid cluttering, with a slight abuse of notation, we use "e  E R(s , t )"  to mean that link e is on 
some path belonging t,o R(s.  t ) .  Similarly for a node v. A route-based filter is maximal if it satisfies 
Fe(s ,  t)  = O if; and only if: there exists a path in R(s ,  t )  with e as one of its links. Thus a maximal route- 
based filter carries out all the filtering of spoofed I P  traffic that is possible without adversely affecting 
routing of non-spoofed I P  packets as determined by R.  If a set of route-based filters collectively were 
"perfect" in the sense that no spoofed datagrain is allowed to reach its destination, then this may be 
'Router topologies ma\ ol~ey powel.-law connectivity structure sirllilar to .4S topologies [6. 181. There are. ho\vever. 
sernar~tic differences bet\vcer~ .AS and router to11ologies-e.g.. geograpl~ical distance between tmo riodes i r ~  arl .4S graph 
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viewed as providing a form of authentication service. Computing a maximal route-based filter-e.g.. 
represented as a table-is straightforward. but it requires in general O(n2) space ( n  = IVI) which is an 
overwhelming burden to place on routers that are expected to perform fast table look-up. 
A semi-m.aximal filter is a maximal filter which uses oilly the source I P  address of a packet t,o carry 
out its filtering (i.e.. a projection of F,). In other words. fie(s, t )  is a semi-maximal filter with. respect 
to R if 
0. if e E R( s ,v )  for some v E V; fie(s, t )  = 
1 : otherwise. 
Hence., its filtering capability is, in general. less than that of its maximal counterpart,. i.e.. pe(s . t )  5 
F,(s, t) .  Although we lose in potential filtering power-by not much as shown in Sectioil 5-a semi- 
maximal filter can be represented by a filtering table in linear space which brings it in t,he domain of 
feasibility if not practicality. As with routing and techniques for speed-up of routiilg table look-up, 
further optiinizat,ions will be needed to affect practical implementations. 
3.3 A Remark on Implementability 
The most important implementation concern in the context of I P  internetworks is not space 
requirement-many issues are shared with routing table look-up-but the computation of semi-maximal 
filters at routers belonging to participating AS nodes T C V given a routing algorithm R .  The main 
difficulty arises from the fact that I P  routing-inter- and intra-domain-follows a destination-based 
approach where routing table update exchanges convey information about destination reachability but 
not "source reachability." In BGP, for example. an update message contains AS-PATH which is a se- 
quence of AS numbers that identify the autonomous systems-starting with the AS that originated tffe 
advertisement of reachability for an I P  prefix-from which, if assuming bi-directionality and bounce- 
back of an "ACK-to-Update" message, source information may be extracted. At a minimum this would 
require augmentation to BGP, or introduction of a new protocol that interacts with BGP. In addition, 
some form of compression and encoding may be needed to keep the return messages small-including 
merger of several ACK-to-Update messages a t  branch points-given their tendency to grow in number 
and size tile closer they reach the target AS (the essential overhead associated with breaking routing 
asymmetry). Other cllallenges arise when trying to construct an accurate global AS routing map. 
We do not have an answer to the efficient implementability question for I P  internets. This may. 
perhaps, be route-based DPFis Achilles' heel. We view the contribution of this paper to lie in the 
definition and evaluation of a scalable DDoS prevention architecture as part of a set of fundament-a1 
solutions to t,he denial-of-service attack problem (of which there are few), and Internet specificity is 
injected with respect to showing how filtering performance depends on topological properties of Internet 
AS. We believe that the performance results for route-based D P F  are encouraging and suggest that 
investigation of how to implement route-based DPF  so as to minimize overhead and cost for Internet 
deployment may be worthwhile and should be the focus of future effort. However, a cost-benefit analysis 
of the ga.iiis vis-a-vis the associated costs is a matter of debate and further examination. 
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3.4 Performance Measures for Distributed Packet Filtering 
3.4.1 Fi l te r ing  Effect: A t t acke r  a n d  Vic t im  Perspec t ives  
A (semi) nlaxiinal filter is distributed if it is executed at  more than one node in 1". We will use T t,o 
denote a subset T C V of nodes where filtering is performed. We call y = ITI/IVI the coveru.ge ru.t,io. 
To quantify and measure the collective filtering effect of route-based DPF-including I P  t,raceback-we 
define a set of performance metrics that is used in the rest of the paper. First. we define two families 
of variables and Cs:l (a. s ;  t E V) which are then used to define other high-level measures of more 
direct interest and relevance to quant,ifying DDoS mitigation. 
S,,t denotes the set of nodes-more precisely, the set of I P  addresses belonging to an AS node in 
Sa,t-t,l~at an attacker at  AS a can use as spoofed source I P  addresses t,o reach 1 without being cut-off 
by filters executed at  autonomous systems in T. By definition, a E for all a. t E 1'. The larger the 
set the more options an attacker a t  a has in terms of forging the I P  source address field wit11 a 
bogus address which will go undetected and unhindered with respect to R at  filters in T .  Whereas SaZt 
is defined from the attacker's perspective, CS.i captures the victim's perspe~t~ive and denotes the set, 
of nodes that could have sent an I P  packet M ( s ,  t )  with spoofed source I P  address s and destination 
address t which did not get filtered on its way. We allow s E Cs?t for all s .  t E I" in the definition. The 
larger CKt, the more uncertain the victim at  t is upon receiving spoofed packet M ( s .  t )  with respect 
to its true origin. If ICs:tl = 1: then this means that  I P  address s cannot be used by ally attacker 
a. E V (outside of s itself) to mount a spoofed DoS attack aimed at  t .  Figure 3.2 illustrates the impact 
of route-based distributed filtering on curtailing the attacker's ability to engage in spoofing. Without 
Attacker %!j 
Figure 3.2: Left: With route-based filtering executed a t  node 8, the spoofable address range at  atta,ck 
site 1 is reduced from S1.9 = (0: 1 ,2 .3 ,4 ;  5,6,7., 8) to (0; 1,2: 3.4,5). Right,: Distributed filtering with 
filter F a t  AS 3. the spoofable range further reduces to S1;g = (1; 2). 
route-based filtering, an attacker residing a t  AS 1 can disguise himself with undetectable spoofed IP  
addresses belonging to AS 0-8, i.e.. S1,g = (0; 1 , .  . . ,8 ) .  when attacking a server in AS 9. With route- 
based filtering a t  AS 8, the spoof'able address range shrinks to ( 0 , l . .  . . .5 ) .  With distributed filtering 
at  AS 8 and AS 3, S1.g = (1.2). 
3.4.2 Proac t ive  Fi l te r ing  Measu res  
The most immediate-but also practically useless-proactive filtering effect is captured by Q1(r)  which 
is defined as @1(r) = ({t : \J a E V. IS,:tl 5 r)1 n-l .  The range of r is r > 1. Thus, 0 5 Q1(l) < 1 
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denotes the fraction of AS'S that cannot be reached by spoofed  packet,^ from anywhere. The closer 
cP1 ( I )  is to 1, the fewer the number of AS'S exposed to DoS attack. For r 2 2. Q1 (7) has a less relevant 
and directly interpretable meaning. In spite of it,s appealing semantic relevance. we will show that 
cP1 (1) is near zero for Internet AS topologies when the coverage ratio y is not near 1. and t.hlis of little 
import as a performance measure. 
A more subtle. but practically relevant, proactive performance measure is given by 
cP2(l) measures the fraction of attack sites from which sending spoofed IP  packets targeted at  other 
AS is futile since they will be filtered by nodes in T. Thus. if cD2(1) = 0.8: then an attacker wishing to 
engage in DDoS attack cannot make productive use of attack hosts residing in 80% of all alitonomol~s 
systems. This imposes an upper bound on the distributediless of DDoS attack achievable by any 
attacker, severely limiting the latter the closer cP2(1) is to I .  Policy-wise. it is also possible for ot,her AS 
to be "on guard" with respect to traffic emanating from AS where mounting a.n attack is feasible. As 
with cP1(r), cP2(r) does not have directly relevant semantics for r 2 2. Unlike cP1 (1). however. cP2(l) 
achieves large values for Internet AS topologies. It  is our priilcipal proactive performance measure. 
cP3(r), 0: and Q 2 ( r )  are auxiliary metrics capturing proactive filt,ering wit,h less sharply delineated 
semantics which are defined as cP3(r) = I{(a,; t )  : IS,;tl L r)l/n,(n - 1); Q 2 ( r )  = I { s  : V t E V ,  ICs.tl 5 
r ) I /n ,  and O = I{(a.s:t) : s E Sa,t}l/n(n - 1)2 = I{ (a s . t )  : a E Cs,i)l/n(n - I ) ~ .  cP3(1) denotes the 
fraction of all attacker-victim AS pairs (out of a total of n2 - n )  where the attacker cannot reach t,he 
victim with spoofed I P  packets. Thus an attacker whose aim is to wreck general havoc on the Internet 
via DoS attack without specific interest in a particular victi'm may choose random attack site-victim 
pairs to do so. The larger cP3(l)? the less impact such random DDoS attacks will have. O captures the 
reduced attack volume-ratio of unfilterable packets-when: in addition. attacks are mounted using 
randomly inscribed source IP addresses. Q2(7).  viewed from the at,tacker's perspective. represents the 
fraction of all (spoofable) IP addresses whose use would allow the victim to localize the attrack site to 
within r locations. 
3.4.3 Reactive Filtering Measure: IP Traceback 
The performance measures defined in the previous section are proactive in nature in that they capture 
how effectively spoofed I P  packets are prevented from reaching their destination in the first place by 
filters in T. Perfect proactivity, as captured by cP1 (1) >> 0, however, is intrinsically difficult t,o achieve 
in Internet topologies due to their connectivity structure unless the coverage ratio y z 1. Significant, 
albeit imperfect, proactive filtering is captured by the quaiititative values of cP2(1), cP3(1), 0, and 
Q 2 ( r ) ,  where cP2(l) plays the most relevant role. 
Since not all spoofed I P  packets can be effectively filtered. complementing the proactive performance 
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measures is the reactive metric Ql (7) which capt,ures the IP  traceback (or source identification) effect: 
For example, Ql (5) represents the fraction of (target,) autonomous systems which. when attacked with 
an arbitrary spoofed IP  packet, can resolve the attack location to witllin 5 possible attack sites. The 
parameter 7 > 1-meaningful for values greater than 1 ----represents the u~lcert~ainty associated with IP  
traceback localization2. If Q1 (7) = 1 for r a sillall constant. t,hen those spoofed IP  flows that cannot 
be prevented from penetrat,ing the "filter net" spa.ilned by nodes in T can be effectively localized with 
respect t o  their true attack origin to within r candidate sites. i.e.. we achieve IP  traceback. This can 
act as a deterrent as well as allow responsive on-line counter measures to be lindertaken against the 
attacking party including isolation of offending flows at  appropriate peering points. Q3(7) is analogously 
defined as Q3(7) with Cs.t in place of S,:, but does not have relevant semantics and is omitted from 
further consideration. 
4 Performance Evaluation and Benchmarking Issues 
4.1 Overall Objectives 
Formally a route-based (semi) maximal distributed filter F is given by a triple F = (G,T,  R) where 
G = (V. E) is the AS graph, T C V the subset of AS where route-based filtering is performed, and R 
is the routing algorithm. For two route-based DPF's F = (G, T, R) and F = (G. TI. R )  with T C TI, 
it can be checked that IS,,tl < and JC,.ll < ICL,,I for all a. s. t E V. This. in turn, implies 
Q2(1) 5 Qh(1) and Q1( r )  < Q i ( r )  for all 7 2 1. Similar monotoilicity properties hold for the other 
performance metrics. Moreover. @h(l) = Qi(1) = 1 if T' = V (i.e., there is a trivial lower bound). 
Evaluating the effectiveness of F with respect to the proactive and reactive performance measures 
entails studying its dependence on topology G. the size of the filter net T .  its structure, and routing 
R .  Our goal is to uncover the above relatioilships and find feasible means to economize T when trying 
to achieve a target performance. 
4.2 Influence of Topology 
Empirical evidence shows that Internet AS topology exhibits power-law connectivity [6, 101 which may 
also hold for router topologies [18]. Power-law graph structure induces "centersx where connectivity 
is concentrated on a few nodes, with most vertices possessing sparse connectivity (e.g., comprised of 
AS stubs and non-transit multi-homed AS). A key aspect of our DDoS benchmark evaluation is to 
ascertain if, and how, topology affects proactive and rcactivc pcrformance of DPF. We cmploy 1997- 
1999 Internet AS topologies taken from NLANR. [16] which have been used in other studies aimed at 
'See [20] for a discussio~l of IP traceback localizat.io11 issues-also called uncertainty factor-u~lder probabilistic packet 
~~ la rk ing .  
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understanding the connectivity structure of Internet topology. especially with respect to its recently 
discovered power-law property [6]. In addition t,o actual Int,ernet AS topologies, we use artificial 
Internet topology gei~erat~ors [12. 1.41 and random graphs to perform comparative benchmarking. An 
(unintended) side effect of our study is the reverse evaluation of artificial topology generators with 
respect to capturing relevalit graph properties-above-and-beyond power-law relations-in the context 
of DPF. 
4.3 Filter Placement 
In addition to the influence of the s,ize of the filter net T on D P F  performance, for a given coverage 
ratio y = ITI/n; the selection of the nodes in T is a key performance variable. We consider the effect 
of choosing T randomly-we sample from 1" uniformly randomly until a target coverage size IT1 is 
reached-and by more custon~ized design rules. in ~a r t~ i cu la r ,  the case when T forms a vertex cover3. 
It can be checked that T being a vertex cover (VC) is neit,her a sufficient nor necessary condition for 
@$(I )  = ! P ~ ( T )  = 1. IIowever. since a VC forms a cover of all edges in the graph--being VC implies 
that on any path, at  least every other vertex on the path belongs to T-it may be expected that t,he 
VC property is conducive to enhancing the performance of DPF. In t,andem, the presence of "centers" 
in power-law graphs leads one to expect that a small coverage ratio y may be achievable. 
Finding a minimal VC in a graph is an NP-complete problem [9]. We use two approximation 
algorithms-one with a constant factor guarantee and the other a heuristic-for finding small VCs. 
The first algorithm is a well-known constant-factor approximation scheme whose output is guaran- 
teed to be at  most twice as large as an optimal VC [19]. There is a randomization component, and 
the approximation Scheme is run ~nultiple (in our evaluations 111) times with the smallest VC con- 
stituting the final output. The second algorithm is a heuristic: little is known rigorously about its 
behavior although, in practice; it oftentimes outperforins the constant-factor approximation scheme. 
The heuristic--greedy algorithin-iteratively grows a VC by picking a node which covers the most 
remaining uncovered edges. The presence of centers in power-law graphs makes it more conducive for 
the heuristic to find small VCs which is verified in our performance results. We use the minimum VC 
found by the two algorithms as our T .  
We also consider a rank-based placement strategy to isolate VC's tendency to pick "large centers'' 
vis-A-vis its complete edge covering property. We call this algorithm Rank, and it simply orders vertices 
by their degree (in decreasing order) and selects the top y percentage as elements of T. We show that 
Rank-even with larger T---affects a diininished performance effect than VC. 
4.4 Maximal vs. Semi-maximal Filters 
Our performance results are for semi-maximal filters which are, in general, less powerful than max- 
imal filters. In cornparative evaluations we show that replacing semi-maximal with maximal filters 
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results only in ail incremental improvement in proactive/reactive filtering performance. The marginal 
performailce difference-e.g., maximal filtering can localize to within 4 sites for IP  traceback instead 
of 5-justifies t,he use of semi-maximal filters when performing route-based DPF  in addition to its 
con~iderat~ion f efficiency. 
4.5 Ingress Filtering 
Consider the case ~vhen the nodes in T were to perforin ingress filtering only. Then for coverage 
ratio y = ITl/n.. tile DDoS prevention performance effect as capt,ured by @ 2 ( 1 )  and Q l ( r )  would be: 
Q2(1) = y. Q1(r)  = 0 for 7 < n - IT1 and Q1(r)  = 1 for 7 > n, - ITI. Thus, ingress filtering, unless 
carried out alillost everywhere, is an ineffective DDoS prevention strategy. Even when y = 0.95: for 
the 1999 Internet AS topology where n = 4872. IP  traceback capability as captured by Q1 incurs a 
non-constant uncert,ainty factor of 243 (the t,rivial number of possible attack sites to investigate when 
trying to pin down the true attack location). There is little compelling reason for a group of AS in 
the global Int,ernet t,o form t,rusted security partnerships based on mandatory ingress filtering since the 
collective perforinailce effect, is low. In contrast, we show that when AS in T implement route-based 
DPF: then with y < 0.2 coverage Q2(1) > 0.88 and Q1(5) = 1 for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. 
4.6 Routing 
The set of feasible routes is influenced by topology but, in addition, we consider the impact of having 
multiple paths froin source to destination. Not,e that R' C R implies Q2(1) < @;(I) and Q1 (7) < Qi (7) 
for all 7 2 1. Consider routring policies that allow R to have up to m separate paths-not necessarily 
disjoint,-bet,ween two nodes. This allows us to evaluat,e the influence, other things being equal, that the 
more paths are permitted when routing a packet from source to destination, the more easily the packet 
can elude rout,e-based filtering when using spoofed source I P  addresses. The latter is due to the attack 
site's spoofable IP  a.ddress space S,:l having increased. When multi-path routing is performed between 
two nodes a and t with IR(a. t)l = m: we select m shortest paths from L(a ,  t ) .  In the case where two 
or more candida.tes have t,he same path length, we choose the path coming first in the canonical (i.e., 
lexicographic) order. We give special names to two extreme forins of R:  loose and tight. "R=loose" 
means that all possible paths among two nodes can be used for routing, i.e., R (a l  t )  = L(a,  t ) .  When 
R allows only a single routing path ( m  = I ) ,  we choose a shortest path between a and t ,  and denote 
this case as "R=tight." 
5 Performance Results 
We have built, a performance evaluation tool called dpf which implements the benchmarking set-up 
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generatioil of T with various input specifications including random selection, VC, and rank ordering. 
dpf is t,he main module which coinputes S,.t and C,.L: its input specification include the filter type, T, 
and routing algorithm. s t a t s  takes the output of dpf and computes the various performance measures 
including @ ( I )  and Q ( r ) .  We use topology generators Inet [12] and Brite 1141 to generate benchmark 
graphs wliich are included in the test suite. 
5.2 Proactive Filtering Effect 
5.2.1 Limitations to Perfect Proactivity 
cP1 (1) measures the fraction of AS which are immune from DoS attack-i.e., no spoofed IP packet can 
reacli t h e n  distributed or single-source. Figures 5.1 (left) and (middle) show Q1(r)  as a function 
of' T for different coverage and routing combinations for 1997 Internet AS topology (IVI = 3015 and 
IEl = 5230). In Figure 5.1 (middle). (P1(r) = 0 up to r = 4. That  is, perfect proactivity where 
t,here exists at  least one AS that is immune froin DoS attack from anywhere is unachievable at 18.9% 
coverage ratio under the best of circumstances. The two graphs show that,  overall. R = tight gives 
better performance than R = loose and. other thing being equal, T being VC- -the size of the 1997 
I i~ t e~ i i e t  AS vertex cover is 18.9%-is more effective than T being random even with higher coverages 
R.nd30 (7 = 0.3) and Rnd5O (y = 0.5). These plots depict a general trend but are not otherwise very 
useful since for performance evaluation purposes only a l ( l )  has direct relevance. 
Figure 5.1: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: a l ( r )  for R = loose. Middle: (PI (7) for R = tight. Right: 
(1) as a function of (TI while maintaining VC property. 
Figure 5.1 (right) shows that the limitation to achieving perfect proactivity does not change when 
tshe VC is grown to larger sizes up to 100%. Although eventually @ ] ( I )  becomes positive when cov- 
erage is above 90%, its value is negligible to warrant the high cost of almost full coverage. Perfect 
proactivity as captured by iP1(l) is int,rinsically difficult to attain, and should not be construed as a 
viable performance goal. 
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5.2.2 DDoS and Proactive Filtering 
a 2 ( 1 )  nlea.sures the fraction of AS from which DoS attacks cannot be launched since all spoofed 
packets-whoever their target-will be detected and filtered. @2(1) thus puts an upper bound on the 
distxibutedness of DDoS attacks. Figure 5.2 (left) and (middle) show Q2(7) as a function of r for 
R = loose and R = tight. As with Q1. Q2(r )  for r 2 2 does not have a concrete, relevant meaning and 
are shown to depict the general trend. Figure 5.2 (right) is the more relevant plot which shows Q2(1) 
Figure 5.2: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: Q2(r) as a function of r for R = loose. Middle: 
Correspondiilg graph for R = tight. Right: Qn(1) for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. 
for Internet AS topologies during 1997- 1999. cP2(1) achieves a value of around 88% during the three 
years which implies that only 12% of all autonomous systems can be used by attackers to launch DoS 
attacks. Since the number of AS'S has grown from 3015 in 1997 to  3575 in 1998 to 4872 in 1999. the 
absolute number of possible attack sites has grown commensurately. However. as a percentage, viable 
attack sites have remained well-behaved at 12%. 
Figure 5.3 (left) shows Q3(r)  as a function of r with Q3(1) = 0.96. That is, only 4% of all source- 
destination AS pairs are feasible attack ASJvictim AS combinations from the attacker's perspective, 
where spoofed packets emitted from the attack AS can reach the victim AS. For example, an attacker 
who tries to enlist attack hosts in a DDoS attack by intruding these hosts will waste 96% of its effort 
if the source-destination AS'S are chosen randomly. Thus proactive filtering erects barriers in terms of 
effort and cost to mounting effective DoS attacks which, in turn, can act as a deterrent in addition to 
Figure 5.3: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: (P3(r). Middle: O as a fu~lction of ITI. R.ight: Q2(r ) .  
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its primary curtailing effect. Figure 5.3 (middle) shows 0. the coarsest measure. which represents the 
fraction of source. destination. and spoof address triples (a. t ,  s)  where a host residing at  AS a is able to 
send an I P  packet to target AS t with spoofed source I P  address s.  We observe that for coverage above 
20%. the fract,ion of forgeable triplets shrinks to near 0. This means that if. in addition to a and t,  the 
spoof address s is randomly generated. then the spoofed I P  packet has almost zero chance of reaching 
its target. Figure 5.3 (right) shows Q2( r )  as a function of ' r .  For an uncertainty factor of r = 20, the 
fraction of traceable-i.e.. to  within r sites-IP addresses is nearly 1. Collectively, these results show 
that the attacker's effort, resources, and sophistication needed to launch a successful DDoS attack is 
significant and brought about by route-based DPF's proactive filtering effect. 
5.3 Reactive Filtering Effect: IP Traceback 
As shown in the previous section, eliminating all spoofable I P  flows is an unrealistic goal given its 
intrinsic difficulty with respect to Internet AS connectivity. A different consequence of proactive fil- 
tering is the more subtle. complementary effect where spoofed I P  flows that cannot be prevented from 
penetrating the network system can be localized to within a few possible sites. This is aflected by DPF  
filtering sufficiently many flows such that the remaining spoofable I P  flows form a sparse subset which, 
in turn, facilitates source identification, i.e.. I P  traceback. 
Figure 5.4 shows Q1(7) as a function of r for R = loose. tight, and T = VC. Rnd30. R.nd50. The 
general trend shows that Q1(r)  undergoes a sharp transition at  some r value, especially for T = VC 
and R = tight. Figure 5.5 (left) shows Q1(r)  for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies for 1 < r < 10. 
Figure 5.4: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: Q1(r )  for R = loose. Right: Q l ( r )  for R = tight. 
We observe that across 1997, 1998, and 1999, Q1(5) is preserved-i.e., every attack call be localized 
to within 5 candidate sites-and the only performance difference occurs for r < 5 where Q1 (7) < 1. 
IP  traceback is achieved "instantly" and thus allows speedy on-line response by the attacked site with 
respect to actions against the perpetrating attack site. Cornpared to probabilistic pa.cket marking, 
route-based DPF is proactive even with respect to I P  t,raceback since a single spoofed IP  packet 
suffices to reveal the attacker's AS location to within a sinall constant number of locations. In PPNI, a 
sufficient number of DoS attack packets must be received before the a.ttack path call be reconstructed by 
the probabilistically inscribed link values in the I P  datagram [20, 231. Thus, not only can route-based 
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Figure 5.5: Left: Ql (7) for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. Right: Shape of Ql (7) for IT1 = c . JVCI 
with dilation factor c = 1 ,2 , .  . . , 5 .  
DPF  emulate the I P  traceback prowess of PPM,  it can do so more efficient,ly and speedily than PPM. 
Figure 5.5 (right) shows the marginal benefit of increasing the number of nodes in T after achieving 
T =VC. We observe that increasing the size of t,he vertex cover as represe~lted by the dilation factor 
c = ITIIIVCI has only an incremental effect. This shows that much of the IP  traceback effect is attained 
at the smaller vertex cover size (18.9%) which facilitates economy of coverage and deployment. 
5.4 Maximal Filters vs. Semi-maximal Filters 
All the results reported in this paper are. by default, based on semi-maximal filters. To ascertain the 
potential performance loss due to not using maximal filters, we compare filtering performance with 
respect to Ql (7) and cP2(l). Figure 5.6 (left) shows Ql (7) for 1997 Int,erilet AS topology as a function 
of T when performing route-based DPF  with maximal versus semi-maximal filters under R = tight 
and T being VC. We observe that the performance difference in I P  traceback capability as captured 
by Q1(r)  is minimal. For example. for T = 5. there is no performance difference. Figure 5.6 (right) 
compares cP2(l) for maximal and semi-maximal filters which, in fact, are equal. Thus the marginal 
performance difference coupled with space efficiency warrants the use of semi-maximal filters when 
implementing route-based DPF. 
I I 
Maximal Semi-maximal 
Figure 5.6: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: Comparison of Q1(r)  for maximal and semi-maximal 
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5.5 Impact of Network Topology 
5.5.1 Internet AS Topology 
Figure 5.7 shows the vertex cover sizes (expressed as a percentage) and q1(5)  values for 1997-1999 
Internet AS topologies. We observe that IVClln-as well as q l ( 5 )  and a2(l)-remain invariant over 
1997-1999. In the rest of this section we focus on Q1(7) and discuss the results for a2 (1 )  when their 
performance is qualitatively different. The size of the vertex cover plays an important role as an 
Figure 5.7: Vertex cover size IVCl/n and Q1 (5): Q2(1) for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies 
intermediate indicator and facilitator of filtering performance. In fact, the smaller the VC, the better 
the filtering performance in spite of the small coverage ratio-note that y = IVClln-which indicates 
that the VC property and its relative size is a useful indicator of connectivity property relevant to DPF  
performance. 
5.5.2 Random Topology 
We generate p-random graphs by connecting two nodes with link probability p. For a given Internet 
AS graph, we generate its corresponding random graph by setting p = f i  where e = El. The 
specification and p values for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies are shown in Figure 5.8 (left). The two 
families of graphs differ oilly in their connectivity pattern. Figure 5.8 (middle) shows vertex cover size 
of the generated random graphs and corresponding Internet AS topologies. On average, the VC sizes of 
Figure 5.8: Left: Link probabilities for random graphs corresponding to 1997-1999 Internet AS topolo- 
gies. Middle: IVClIn as a function of p and comparison with Internet AS. Right: Q1(7) plot. 
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the random graphs are 2.5 larger than their Internet AS counterparts. Figure 5.8 (right) shows Q1(r )  
as a fuilction of r for different topologies. I11 spite of engaging more nodes when performing filt,ering. 
the perforn~ance as captured by Q1(r)  is significantly less than that of Internet AS topology. Nloreover. 
the perforinailce difference amplifies as the size of the graph increases. Recall that the performance 
values for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies (see Figure 5.5 (left)) stayed invariant,. 
5.5.3 Inet Topology Generator 
We use Inet 2.0 [12]< a network topology generator, for generating artificial topologies closer to the In- 
ternet in their connectivity structure than random graphs. Inet is designed to generate graph topologies 
with connectivity properties similar to Internet AS in terms of power-law structure. Figure 5.9 (left) 
shows the VC sizes of Inet generated graphs and their Internet AS counterparts for 1997-1999. We 
observe that the VC sizes of Inet graphs are about 50% larger than corresponding Internet AS graphs. 
Figure 5.9 (middle) shows Q1(r )  as a function of r for Inet? Internet AS, and random graphs. We 
observe, as expected. that filtering performance for Inet graphs is closer to that of Internet AS than 
random graphs. 
Figure 5.9: Left: VC sizes for Inet graphs and corresponding Internet AS graphs. I\/liddle: Comparison 
of Q1(r)  of Inet graph with Internet AS and random graphs. Right: Performance difference between 
Inet and Internet AS graphs normalized by VC size: Q1(5)/(IVCl/n). 
Figure 5.9 (right,) shows normalized filtering performance Tl(r) = Q l ( r ) / y  for r = 5 where the 
relative size of the filter set is incorporated. Since Q1( l )  = 1 if T = V no matter what the structure 
of the underlying topology, TI measures filtering performance per filter node (relative t,o IVI) which is 
a more accurat,e metric for comparative evaluation. Figure 5.9 (right) shows that there is significant 
difference in DPF performance between Inet and Internet AS topologies stemming, in part,  from VC 
size difference. Inet is a topology generator whose primary feature is that of emulating power-law 
relations for vertex degrees as observed in [6]. The fact that the well-known VC graph property 
exhibits nontrivial gaps between Internet AS and Iilet topologies indicates that more refined structure 
' W e  also tested wit11 berlchrnark graphs gelierated by Inet2.1-it was corlveyed to us recently that Ir1et2.0 had a bug 
w11e11 gerleratirlg large graphs of size 30K-with sin~ilar results. The Irlet2.1 graphs resulted irl a ~nargirlally sr~~al ler  \'C 
size---less tllan 2% differe~~ce-for graph sizes correspolldirlg to 1997-1999 111ternet AS topologies. 
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Figure 5.10: Left: Comparison of Q2(1) for Inet and 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. Right: Corre- 
sponding comparison of normalized G 2  (1) = Q2 ( l ) / y .  
may need to be uncovered within the family of power-law graphs to accurately capture the Internet's 
topological properties. 
Figure 5.10 (left) shows a comparison of Q2(1) for Inet and 1997-1999 Internet AS t,opologies. As 
with Q1 (7). we observe a persistent gap in reactive filtering performance which is consistent with the 
corresponding gap in the VC size. Figure 5.10 (right) shows normalized I P  traceback performance 
- 
Q2(1) = Q 2 ( l ) l y  for the same benchmark set-up which incorporates the size of the filter net in the 
performance measure. As expected. performance difference is furt,her amplified. 
5.5.4 B r i t e  Topology G e n e r a t o r  
Brite 1141 is a network topology generator that,  in addition to capturing power-jaw connectivity struc- 
ture. seeks to inject spatial proximity in the constructive process. Brite specifies seven parameters: size 
of higher plane (I-IS), size of lower plane (LS): number of nodes (n) ,  number of edges added for each new 
node (in), node placement (NP),  preferential connectivity5 (PC),  and incremeiltal growth (IG). When 
PC=O, a new node is connected to node i with Waxman's probability density [32], pi = ae-dl(pL).  
where 0 < a , p  < 1, d is the Euclidean distance between two nodes, and L is the maximum distance 
between any two nodes. When PC=1, a new node connects to node i with probability I?-- where 
Cj€C' d~ 
d, is the degree of node i and C is the set of candidate neighbor nodes. With PC=2, the probability of 
connecting to node i is given by ,ptdb . Thus PC=O considers spatial proximity only. PC=1 focuses J E C  3 3 
on power-law structure as captured by node degree distribution, and PC=2 is a hybrid. 
Using I-IS=1000, LS=10, IG=l .  and n=3015, test graphs were generated with the three P C  options. 
The specification and results for VC size are shown in Figure 5.11 (left). Figure 5.11 (middle) and 
(right) show the performance effects with respect to Q1(r )  and a2 (1 ) ,  respectively. When PC=O. 
we observe that the graph generated-in addition to not being power-law-has too small VC (3.6%). 
Its performance with respect to Q1(r )  and a2 (1 )  is closer than that of PC=1 and 2. however. the 
performance gap from the corresponding Internet AS topology for a 2 ( 1 )  is significant,. being worse 
5~11e Brite generator [14] had a s~rlall bug wit11 respect to option PC=2 which was fixed 
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Figure 5.11: Left: VC sizes for Brite graphs with PC=O. 1. and 2. Middle: Q l ( r )  as a function of r 
for PC=O, 1. and 2. Right: Corresponding cPz(l) plot. 
than that of the Inet generator. For PC=1 and 2. the VC sizes are too large. and performance for both 
Q l ( r )  and Q2(1) significantly worse than Internet AS (and Inet). We have tried the Brite generator 
with other parameter specifications but were unsuccessful in ,get,ting topologies that resemble Internet 
AS both from the VC size and filtering performance perspectives. We have also tried extending option 
PC=2 by using the weighting q, + (1 - c r ) L  to inject both spatial and degree sensit,ivity in a 
C ,EC.~J  
more controlled fashion. As cr increases lVCl monot,onically decreases. and for cr = 0.13 the VC size 
can be approximated to that of Internet AS with Q1 (7) close to its Internet AS value. However. the 
corresponding Qz( l )  performance is dismal (about 20%) when compared to Internet AS. 
5.5.5 Rank-based Filter Placement 
Figure 5.12 shows filtering performance of rank-based filter placement for a range of coverage ratios. 
Compared to VC-based filt,ering which has coverage ratio y = 0.189. we observe that both Ql (7) and 
Q2(1) show diminished performalice even when their coverage ratio is higher. Note that the greedy 
algorithm for vertex cover selects vertices that are able to cover the maximum number of remaining 
edges which is not the same as picking maximum degree nodes. The performance gap indicates that 
selection of high degree vertices as filtering sites is an important-but not the only-- -- effect of VC-based 
filter selection on D P F  performance in Internet AS topology. Indeed, rank-based filter placement can 
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Figure 5.12: 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: Con~parison of Q1 (7) for rank-based filter placement 
with y = 0.20.0.25,0.30.0.35 versus VC-based T. Right: Corresponding comparison for Qz( l ) .  
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lead to inefficiencies by selecting high-degree nodes t.hat are incident on edges that are already covered. 
This suggests that optimal filter placement, may be an NP-hard problems. 
5.6 Ingress Filtering 
Section 4.5 showed that ingress filtering is not a viable st,rategy for achieving proactive and reactive 
filtering performance for DDoS attack prevention. Sirice AS belonging to T represent "trusted" domains 
where route-based DPF is guaranteed to be executcd a t  its border routers. ingress filtering was assumed 
to be carried out by AS belonging to T. It is. however. conceivable that AS i11 T implement route- 
based D P F  but do not assure ingress filtering. That is. they seek to protect themselves from external 
DoS attack flows while allowing DoS attacks to occur within their domain including those targeted at 
other domains. Figure 5.13 shows proactive and reactive filtering performance when AS in T perform 
route-based DPF  but do not perform ingress filt,ering. Figure 5.13 (left) shows Q1 (r) for 1997-1999 
Internet AS topologies. We observe that there is a perforinance penalty such that Q1(5) # 1. On 
Figure 5.13: R.oute-based DPF  without'ingress filtering. Left: Q1(r )  as a function of r for 1997-1999 
Internet AS topologies. Right: Corresponding a2 (1 )  values. 
the other hand. Q1(20) = 1 for all t,hree years. That  is. I P  traceback can localize the attack site 
to within 20 locations. This is worse than 5-the number achievable with ingress filtering-however, 
considering that there were in the range 3000-5000 autonomous systems during 1997-1999. 20 is still a 
small constant, and thus managable number. Figure 5.13 (right) shows the corresponding a2 (1 )  values. 
a2 (1 )  drops from around 90% to 70% which is still significantly higher than the 20% proactive effect 
achievable with ingress filtering alone. Interestingly. the performance gap of 20% roughly corresponds 
to the coverage ratio y = ITl/n for V C  in the Internet AS topologies. 
5.7 Multi-path Routing 
If multiple paths are permitted when routing  packet.^ froin source to destination. the more easily packets 
can elude route-based filtering when using spoofed source I P  addresses. Figure 5.14 shows the impact 
of multi-path routing on filtering performance. Figure 5.14 (left) and (middle) show that traceback 
"his is an i~lterestillg problerrl to explore in future wol-k. Gellerally, it ruay be fruitful t o  illvestigate whether network 
resource allocatio~l problelrls can be lrlore accurately sol\,ed--NP-llard~~ess will re1nai11-for a fa111ily of power-lam graphs. 
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capability as captured by Q1 (7) decreases gradually as the number of multi-paths allowed is increased. 
A similar result holds for cD2(1) and is shown in Figure 5.14 (right). Collectively, these performance 
plots show that  presence of mult,i-paths--a more coininoil phenomenon in Internet AS topologies than in 
router topologies-has a graded effect and does not significantly impact the effectiveness of route-based 
DPF. 
T~ghl 2 3 4 Loose 
Figure 5.14: Effect of multi-pat,]] rout,ing for 1997 Internet AS topology. Left: Q1(7). Middle: Dis- 
tribution of Q1(5) and Q1(lO) over the number of multi-paths. Right: a2 (1 )  for R from tight to 
loose. 
6 Conclusion 
We have described a proact,ive/reactive approach to distributed DoS attack prevention based on route- 
based distributed packet filtering. We have shown route-based DPF's efficacy at  proactively curtailing 
spoofed I P  flows from reaching their intended targets, including the drastically reduced Internet AS sites 
from which such attacks can be launched. We have shown that perfect proactivity-no spoofed I P  flow 
can penetrate-is intrinsically difficult to achieve in Internet AS topologies while maintaining sparse 
(e.g.: 20% or less AS sites deploying route-based DPF) coverage. However, this is mitigated by the 
fact that those spoofed I P  flows that  can penetrate the filter net can be localized to within 5 candidate 
sites which facilitates efficient I P  traceback. Compared to probabilistic packet marking, we have shown 
that route-based D P F  is able to solve PPM's three key weaknesses (see Section 2). We have also 
shown that  the filtering effect achieved by route-based D P F  is sensitive to the underlying Internet AS 
connectivity structure. In part,icular. we have shown that power-law structure of Internet AS topology 
plays an important role in facilitatirig proactive/reactive filtering. Finding efficient implementations 
for computing semi-maximal filters and evaluating the costs associated with deployment and router 
overhead vis-2-vis the performalice benefits of route-based DPF is a major challenge and a task for 
future work. 
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